

ture seems to have served well. But the sharp separation of policy and intelligence is partly artificial. Obviously no intelligence system can attempt to gather and digest all "the facts." Its role is to reveal the threats and dangers as well as the opportunities for the nation to pursue in its external relations. But these notions presuppose certain goals as a starting point, though the estimates may modify views on them. And the actions of a major power like ours are bound to influence, for better or worse, an evolving situation. In projecting future conditions, therefore, what the estimates assume about the course and effects of American policy will color and may determine the conclusions. And that may entail either of two dangers: if the intelligence estimates assume the continuance of existing policy and disregard possible alternatives which might prove more fruitful, the effect may be to shield the policy-maker from timely reappraisal of his policies. But if they are based on alternative assumptions about our own policy, they may come close to recommending one course or another by the mere recital of anticipated consequences. If this dilemma is not to produce a serious no-man's land, the intelligence estimator and the policy-maker must collaborate closely. While the book touches briefly on this area, it does not examine the problem in any depth.

From his experience both as diplomat and as head of CIA, Mr. Dulles should certainly have pertinent things to say on both these topics. Despite these omissions, however, his illuminating discussion should contribute to better public understanding of the aspects of intelligence which he has treated.



as an enemy of Yugoslavia's prewar regime. Although he has become an "un-person" so far as the Yugoslav government and Communist party are concerned—his name is never mentioned in the press and does not appear at all in the new Yugoslav Encyclopedia—he is known throughout the world. He will continue to be known so long as he is provided with writing

The relationship of intelligence to policy-making, too, might constructively have been considered. As Mr. Dulles says, CIA was set up separately from the State and Defense Departments to guard against the distortion of intelligence by preconceived policy views. That purpose is entirely sound, and the present struc-